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Abstract
This paper addresses the now famous question of “Does Money Matter?” in public education.
While the general consensus is that additional expenditures may improve educational
outcomes, this is by no means a guarantee. Indeed, some studies indicate that a school’s
resources are not an important determinant of student performance. As Adkins and Moomaw
(2003) suggest, the true relationship between resources and performance may become more
apparent in a better specified model accounting for technical inefficiency. Along these lines,
we attempt to measure the technical efficiency gains of charter schools over traditional public
schools using a stochastic frontier production model.
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1.  Introduction 
 
The usual argument in favor charter schools centers on the idea that charter schools bring 
about increased competition for students, encouraging the adoption of more effective 
teaching methods at lower costs.  Teske, et. al. (2000) suggest that the presence of charter 
schools spurs the managers of traditional public schools to increase efficiency and adopt 
more innovative methods of teaching.
1  But, while traditional public schools have improved 
in response to charter schools, the majority of the evidence suggests that charter school 
performance has outpaced that of public schools.
2  King (2007) argues that for-profit charter 
schools face a greater incentive to expand enrollment than do not-for-profit charters and 
provides evidence that student achievement is indeed higher at for-profit charter schools.   
 
The literature mentioned above addresses only the first of two claimed benefits of charter 
schools: improved teaching methods leading to improved student achievement.  However, it 
is unclear whether this improved performance is the result of increased resources or the more 
efficient use of resources.  Theory would suggest that the organizational structure of a school 
should have a significant effect on the efficiency of a school, with for-profit charters being 
more efficient than both not-for-profit charters and traditional public schools. In order to test 
this hypothesis, we need some measure of efficiency.  A modern approach to measuring and 
modeling inefficiency in the production literature is to use stochastic frontier analysis. This 
approach can be extended to education. 
 
In Stochastic Frontier Analysis efficiency, or more precisely inefficiency, is measured as the 
distance between some stochastic frontier and the actual production or cost point.  That 
inefficiency is usually assumed to be function of a set of exogenous variables.  In the case of 
education, we are therefore adding an inefficiency term to the typical education production 
function, and that inefficiency term is a function of school related variables.  This approach 
gives us a measure of inefficiency and we can determine if school organization influences 
inefficiency. 
 
While the use of stochastic frontier models in education is not new, their use in the 
comparison of traditional public schools and charter schools is.  Ruggiero and Vitaliano 
(1999) use a stochastic cost function approach to measure efficiency in New York Schools.  
They find that urban schools tend to be more cost efficient.  Adkins and Moomaw (2003) 
examine Oklahoma public school districts and find that spending does affect technical 
efficiency. 
 
2. Stochastic Production Frontier Analysis 
Consider a determinist production frontier model  
 
  ( ) i i y f x b = ,   (1) 
 
                                                
1 See also Holmes, et. al (2003) and Hoxby (2003) for further evidence of traditional public school 
improvements in response to the presence of charter schools. 
2 Hoxby (2004) finds evidence that charter school students across the nation are 3.2 and 5.2 percent more likely 
to be proficient in math and reading, respectively, and Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) find that in Chicago 
achievement scores are roughly six percentiles higher for students who enroll in charter schools by grade five.  
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where  i y  is the output for producer i,  i x  is the vector of inputs for producer i, b  is a vector 
of parameters, and f(*) is technology transforming inputs into the outputs.   In the case of 
education,  i y  is typically test scores or graduation rates, and  i x  typically contains 
expenditures per student, student characteristics, and teacher characteristics.  
 
By incorporating a random component, we can allow output to differ randomly between 
producers. This stochastic production frontier can be specified as  
 
  ( )
i v
i i y f x e b = ,   (2) 
 
where  i v  is an independent and identically distributed random variable typically assumed to 
be normally distributed.  
 
We can further augment the model, by allowing producers to produce at a point below the 
production frontier. Let  
 
  ( )
i v
i i i y f x TE e b = ,   (3) 
 
where 0 1 i TE < £  represents a producers technical efficiency. If  1 i TE =  then the firm is 
producing on their frontier and are considered technically efficient. If  1 i TE < , the firm is 
producing below its frontier and has some degree of technical inefficiency. Letting 
i u
i TE e
- =  
and taking the natural log of both sides,  
 
  ( ) ( ( )) i i i i ln y ln f x v u b = , + -   (4) 
 
Equation 4 represents a typical stochastic production frontier model.
3  In earlier stochastic 
frontier analysis,  i u  was assumed to follow some one-sided distribution such as a truncated 
normal or exponential distribution. In more recent analysis, the model is augmented to 
incorporate exogenous influences into the measure of technical efficiency (Battese and Coelli 
1995.) Let  
 
  ( ) i i i u g z e g = , +   (5) 
 
where z is a vector of exogenous parameters affecting efficiency, g  is vector of parameters, 
and  i e  is an i.i.d. random variable that follows a truncated normal distribution.  If g(.) is a 
linear function, we could write 
2 ( ) i i u u N z g s
+ ¢ , ∼ . 
 
If we let 
2 (0 ) i v v N s , ∼  and 
2 ( ) i i u u N z g s
+ ¢ , ∼ , the parameter vector 
2 2 ( ) v u b g s s , , ,  can be 
estimated via maximum likelihood. Additionally, 
i u e  is a measure of the technical 
inefficiency for producer i.  
 
                                                
3 See Meeusen and van den Broeck 1977 and Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977 for early work on stochastic 
frontier analysis.  
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3. Empirical Model 
In order to create an educational stochastic production frontier model that incorporates 
technical effects, we need to do the following: 1) determine what variable will represent 
educational output, 2) determine which variables are direct inputs, 3) determine which 
variables affect efficiency, and 4) specify the functional forms for f(x, b ) and g(x, g ) 
3.1. Output 
In this model, educational output will be measured as a school’s average achievement on a 
standardized test score. Standardized test scores are by far the most prolific measure of 
educational output used in the literature. The main reason for this is because of the 
availability of the data and their ease of use. In addition, test scores provide a quantitative 
look at the performance of a school and since they are standardized, they allow researchers to 
compare schools in different locations.  
 
Hanushek (1986), though indicating that test scores are not an ideal measure of educational 
output, gives three reasons for their use. First he notes that test scores have value in and of 
themselves. Parents, educators, and government officials all look toward test scores as a 
measure of how well schools are doing. Furthermore, test scores are important as a selection 
mechanism for further education.  Therefore, test scores may change real outputs such as 
wages. Finally, Hanushek states that test scores may be a good measure for elementary 
education where cognitive skills are of particular importance.  
3.2. Input and Efficiency Variables 
Determining which variables affect efficiency and which shift the frontier is difficult. 
Typically, those variables which affect efficiency are considered to be exogenous to the 
particular production decisions. The choice of which variables affect the frontier and which 
variables affect efficiency is often a judgment call (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). For this 
study, we make the choice in two different ways. We make a judgment call based on past 
empirical research (most notably Adkins and Moomaw) and we also use a statistical criteria 
based on log-likelihoods.  
3.3. Intuitive Model 
As with output, characterizing educational inputs is not an easy task. First of all, there has to 
be a distinction between quality and quantity of an educational resource. For example, 
teacher characteristics can vary widely even though they may have equal pay and the same 
number of students. However, quality of resources is more difficult to quantify and less data 
is available describing those characteristics. Therefore, in many studies only the quantities of 
educational resources are presented as educational inputs.  
 
All inputs to a student’s educational achievements do not come from school; rather, there are 
other non-school inputs that could have consequences on educational output. Parental 
involvement, the living environment, and peer groups can contribute significantly to student 
achievement. These influences further confound the data problem since data on these 
personal characteristics are not readily available. For this reason, researchers include general 
family characteristics such as parental income and education in an attempt to control for these 
factors when estimating an education production function.  While we admit it is an imperfect 
measure, we include in our model a percent minority variable to capture the effects of non-
school attributes.  
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The primary focus of our study is to examine the use and effectiveness of school inputs 
across traditional public schools and charter schools.  Thus, we include in our analysis school 
specific inputs including teaching expenditure per pupil (teach), administration expenditure 
per pupil (admin), and supplies spending per pupil (supply). We attempt to capture the quality 
effects of these expenditures in our measure of technical efficiency.  
 
Of particular interest in this analysis is the affect of school organization on school efficiency. 
Therefore, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether the school is a for-profit charter 
school (profit) and a dummy variable to indicate whether the school is a non-for-profit charter 
school (nonprofit).  
 
We model teacher quality as an exogenous variable that only affects technical efficiency. We 
use average teacher salaries (salary), average years of experience (exp), and percentage of 
teachers with advanced degrees (Hdegree) as variables measure teacher quality. As 
mentioned above, we attempt to control for non-school inputs with a percent minority 
variable.
4  The input variables and the efficiency variables do not have to be mutually 
exclusive.
5 Therefore, we also include the charter dummy variables as efficiency variables.  
 
We will assume that the production technology has a Cobb-Douglas form. This is similar to 
much of the educational production function literature. As with many stochastic frontier 
models, we will assume that g is a linear function of z.   Following equations (3) and (4) we 
specify the following educational stochastic production frontier model, which serves as our 
intuitive empirical model (model 1):  
 
  0 1 2 3 (test scores) (teach) (admin) (supplies) ln ln ln ln b b b b = + + +   (6) 
  4 5 6 (service) profit nonprofit i i ln v u b b b + + + + -  
where  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 exp profit nonprofit salary minority hdegree i u g g g g g g g = + + + + + +   (7) 
 
with 
2 (0 ) i v v N s , ∼ , and 
2 ( ) i i u u N z g s
+ ¢ , ∼ .  
3.4. Information criterion based model 
Given the ambiguities involved in selecting a model based on a judgment call, we also select 
an alternative model using log likelihoods. 
 
We begin with the entire set of potential variables and try all the combinations of input and 
efficiency variables (given our variables, this equates to 256 possible combinations). We then 
select the model that gives the highest log likelihood. There are no restrictions on which 
variables should appear as input variables and which variables should appear as efficiency 
variables. However, we do allow the charter dummy variables to appear both as efficiency 
and as input variables.  
 
                                                
4A superior measure for controlling for student quality would be a percentage of students participating in free 
and reduced school lunch program. Unfortunately, this data is not available for many charter schools, preventing 
its inclusion in our empirical model. 
5 See Huang and Liu 1993 for an example of a stochastic frontier model where technical efficiency is not neutral 
with respect to its effect on input usage.  
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4. Data and Estimation 
We use data for Arizona public school districts and Arizona charter schools obtained from the 
Arizona Department of Education for year 2001. Table I presents descriptive statistics for all 
the variables included in our analysis.  
 
 Test scores are averages of the math, reading, and language from the 3
rd grade Stanford 
Achievement test.  Expenditure variables are defined as follows: admin is the total 
administration spending divided by total enrollment, supply is the total supply expense 
divided by total enrollment, instruct is total classroom expense divided by total enrollment, 
and support is the total support and other expenses divided by total enrollment. Hdegree is 
the percentage of teachers with a master’s degree or better. exper is our experience variable 
and it is the percentage of teachers that have seven or more years of teaching experience, and 
minority is the average percentage of minority students who took the Stanford Achievement 
Test.  Finally, TeachSal is the total classroom expense divided by the number of teachers in a 
school. 
 
On average, district schools tend to spend considerably more per pupil on administration, 
instruction, and support.  Spending per pupil on supplies, however, is similar across school 
types.  Average tests scores are also similar for the three different types of schools.  District 
schools had a higher percentage of instructors with higher degrees and with more experience.  
Finally, district schools serviced a higher percentage of minority students. 
 
The intuitive model and the automatically selected model are estimated via maximum 
likelihood using Ox (Doornik 2005.) For the logged variables and variables in percentage 
form, the parameter estimates,b , are interpreted as elasticities. The parameter estimates,g , 
are interpreted as the percentage decrease in technical efficiency when there is a one unit 
change in the efficiency variable.  For example, a coefficient estimate of one would be 
interpreted as follows: a one unit change in the variable causes a one percent reduction in 
median technical efficiency.  The marginal effect, evaluated on the frontier, of a charter 
school on a percentage change in test scores can be computed as the difference between the 









3 for not-for-profit charter schools in equation 7.)   
 
Table II reports the results for our judgment model (model 1).  Administration spending tends 
to shift the frontier downward, while instructional spending tends to shift the frontier 
outward.  A one percent increase in administration spending decreases average test scores by 
0.09 %.  A one percent increase in classroom spending increases average test scores by 
0.084%.  Spending on supplies and support were insignificant in this model. 
 
In the efficiency equation, a higher percentage of advanced degrees and higher salaries had 
no statistically significant effect on efficiency.  A more experienced teaching staff greatly 
reduced inefficiency, while an increase in the minority percentage tends to increase 
inefficiency, but by a small amount.6 
 
 
Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Public    Not for Profit Charter    For Profit Charter 
    n=178      n=47      n=12   
Variable    Mean  Std. Dev    Mean  Std. Dev    Mean  Std. Dev 
                   
score    46.21  15.33    45.02  21.48    49.75  23.23 
admin    $1,009.20  $569.75    $510.72  $473.32    $655.78  $23.23 
supply    $231.18  $156.40    $203.56  $179.16    $108.51  $23.23 
instruct    $4,121.55  $1,862.83    $2,111.68  $670.02    $2,126.74  $727.09 
support    $2,331.75  $1,255.49    $1,321.30  $850.90    $1,528.51  $23.23 
Hdegree    0.36  0.16    0.23  0.17    0.16  0.13 
exper    0.56  0.16    0.39  0.21    0.32  0.18 
Minority    0.49  0.32    0.36  0.34    0.20  0.17 
TeachSal   $64,284.96  $22,745.93    $35,938.68  $16,837.77    $43,373.46  $18,612.34  
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The charter school variables appeared to have a mixed effect.  First of all, they appeared to 
have higher frontiers compared to their district counter parts.  However they also appeared to 
be more inefficient.  The total effects are -0.405306 and -0.331598 for for-profit and not-for-
profit charter schools respectively. 
 
This makes sense for many new markets.  Managers are venturing into new waters and, as 
such, are trying many different methods.  Some of these risks pay off, but many do not.  Until 
enough experimentation has been conducted by managers in the industry they are likely to lag 
behind public schools in terms of efficiency merely because public schools have found the 
methods that work “best” for them.  Charter schools are still searching for the most efficient 
method.  The high turnover in the industry is indicative of this: many schools are failing 
financially because their methods were not efficient.  Others are expanding and consolidating.  
It will be interesting to repeat this study in another 10 years or so to see how far charters have 
come. 
 
Table II. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for Model 1 
dependent variable: ln(score)   
  Coefficient Std.Error   t-value   t-prob   
Constant   4.25634   0.3121   13.6   0.00   
lnsupply   0.009661   0.02405   0.402   0.688   
lnsupport   -0.02306   0.04776   -0.483   0.63   
lnadmin   -0.08978   0.04364   -2.06   0.041   
lninstruct   0.084491   0.03596   2.35   0.02   
PCH   0.266812   0.1566   1.7   0.09   
NPCH   0.207168   0.07953   2.6   0.01   
Constant   -0.13232   0.2695   -0.491   0.624   
Hdegree   -0.18993   0.29   -0.655   0.513   
TeachSal   -0.00296   0.02667   -0.111   0.912   
PCH   0.672118   0.294   2.29   0.023   
NPCH   0.538766   0.161   3.35   0.001   
exper   -0.73885   0.2698   -2.74   0.007   
Minority   0.01368   0.002057   6.65   0.00   
sigma2S   0.183717   0.03068   5.99   0.00   
Gamma   0.936928   0.04011   23.4   0.00   
         
log-likelihood   -47.3344        
observations   236     parameters 16   
AIC.T   126.6688     AIC  0.536732   
 
 
Table III reports the results for the automatically selected model (model 2). It is interesting to 
note that the automatically selected model has the expenditure per student variables listed as 
efficiency variables. This should not be too surprising for public schools. Total available 
funding for public and some charter schools are determined from outside sources, such 
revenues from local property taxes.  Additionally, schools have some mandated support 
services which would further constrain a schools ability to allocate moneys to instruction and 
administration. Therefore, it isn’t entirely unreasonable to argue that the spending variables 
are exogenous to the production decision.  
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This model fits the data better than model 1.  It has a log-likelihood ratio of -42.14 compared 
to the -47.33 for model 1.  The major difference between the models is the location of the 
expenditure variables and the degree and salary variables.  The results, however, tend to be 
very similar in terms of the overall effects on test scores. 
 
Salaries are still insignificant, but now a one percent increase in higher degrees results in a 
0.2 percent increase in average test scores.  Percentage of minority students still increases 
inefficiency, while experience tends to decrease inefficiency.  Administration spending tends 
to increase inefficiency and classroom spending tends to decrease inefficiency. The charter 
dummies have the same effects as in model 1.  That is, they increase the frontier but increase 
inefficiency.  There overall effects are also similar. 
 
Table III. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for Model 2 
dependent variable: ln(score)   
  Coefficient  Std.Error   t-value   t-prob   
Constant   4.13268   0.1062   38.9   0.00   
Hdegree   0.2033   0.102   1.99   0.048   
TeachSal   -0.00347   0.01451   -0.239   0.811   
PCH   0.336595   0.1597   2.11   0.036   
NPCH   0.244193   0.07549   3.23   0.001   
Constant   -0.06677   0.8806   -0.0758   0.94   
exper   -0.64767   0.2603   -2.49   0.014   
Minority   0.013905   0.001993   6.98   0.00   
lnsupply   -0.05495   0.04911   -1.12   0.264   
lnsupport   0.004888   0.08643   0.0566   0.955   
lnadmin   0.286377   0.09971   2.87   0.004   
lninstruct   -0.23747   0.1168   -2.03   0.043   
PCH   0.704171   0.3063   2.3   0.022   
NPCH   0.54472   0.1662   3.28   0.001   
sigma2S   0.181858   0.03041   5.98   0.00   
Gamma   0.926688   0.03816   24.3   0.00   
         
log-likelihood   -42.14        
observations   236      parameters  16   
AIC.T   116.28     AIC  0.492712   
 
5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Work 
This paper explores differences in technical efficiency between traditional public schools and 
both profit and non-profit charter schools using a stochastic frontier model.  We find that 
administration spending tends to have a negative effect on test scores, while classroom 
spending tends to have a positive effect on test scores.  Spending on support services or 
supplies had little effect on test scores.  More experienced teachers tended to increase 
efficiency, while minority percentage tended to decrease efficiency. 
 
Charter schools, both for profit and not for profit, appeared to have higher frontiers, but lower 
levels of efficiency when compared to traditional schools.  The overall effect of charter 
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